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La laïcité est une condition nécessaire, 
sinon suffisante, à l’exercice des droits 
humains fondamentaux des femmes. 
Elle est également une condition 
nécessaire à l’exercice de la démocratie, 
selon laquelle les lois sont votées par 
le peuple et amendables de part la 
volonté du peuple, et non figées pour 
toujours selon des décrets supposés divins 
interprétés par des humains le plus 
souvent réactionnaires. La politique 
communautariste d’une partie de 
l’Europe se fonde sur une re-definition 
de la laïcité (en tant que séparation des 
religions et du pouvoir politique), en la 
remplaçant par celle d’égale tolérance 
des gouvernements vis à vis de toutes les 
religions. Ce système qui privilégie les 
droits des communautés aux dépens de 
ceux des citoyens supposés y appartenir 
(et souvent enjoints de le faire) soutient 
de fait les fondamentalistes qui oeuvrent 
contre la démocracie, pour l’instaura-
tion de théocracies. Certes, la laïcité à 
elle seule ne peut garantir les droits des 
femmes, mais elle est essentielle pour 
que le fondamentalisme religieux cesse 
d’empiéter sur leurs droits en particulier 
et sur la démocratie en général.
The impact of “sharia courts” on 
women’s rights in the UK cannot be 
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looked at without first exploring how 
secularism represents the last recourse 
for women of migrant Muslim de-
scent in the protection of their legal 
rights, which are now endangered 
in Europe through policies of com-
munalism and cultural relativism. 
However, we first need to clarify what 
is secularism is, as definitions vary in 
different parts of Europe and thus 
bring about different consequences 
for women rights.
Definition(s)
There is an increasing trend among 
English-speaking secularists to adopt 
the French word laïcité1 (which 
they write “laicity”),2 rather than 
“secularism,” on the grounds that 
these concepts do not refer to the 
same reality.
Indeed, the original concept of 
laïcity and the realities defined as 
secular differ in different parts of the 
world. It is clear that the principle of 
laïcity, conceived of under the French 
Revolution as separation of church 
and state, cannot fit unaltered into 
countries where the head of state is 
also the head of the Anglican Church 
(as is the case in the UK), or where 
the federal state collects religious taxes 
through the Länders’ administration 
(Germany), or where one swears on 
the Bible in court (U.S.). Moreover, 
as formerly colonized countries in 
Asia and Africa inherited the British 
concept of secularism, we can say that 
very few countries today are laïques. 
At a time when Muslim fundamen-
talist detractors of laïcity now pretend 
it has been designed to discriminate 
against Muslims in France, it is worth 
considering a bit of history. During 
the French Revolution and for a 
long time afterwards, until World 
War I, there was no Muslim emigra-
tion in France. In fact, it remained 
statistically insignificant until after 
World War II. As the founding laws 
on secularism were passed in 1905-
1906, and therefore they anticipate 
from at least half a century the first 
numerically important migrations 
from North Africa, one needs to 
point at the historical mistake and 
the political manipulation by which 
Muslim fundamentalists today decry 
these laws as “anti-Muslims.”3
Historically, the principle of laïcity 
emerged during the French Revo-
lution, at a time when the political 
power of the Catholic Church over the 
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Kingdom of France was overwhelm-
ing. In an initial stage, it had been a 
hard-won step forward to impose the 
creation of a representative assembly 
to temper the power of the king, and 
then to limit the power of the church 
to only one third of the assembly 
(which was then composed of three 
categories: the nobility, the clergy, and 
a specific category of citizens known as 
the Tiers Etat). “Separation” was then 
an essential component of the eman-
cipation from the Vatican’s political 
power, and was a matter of survival for 
the emerging democracy in France. In 
later developments, the modalities of 
this “separation” between church and 
state were codified, over more than 
a century, until the establishment of 
the laws of 1905-1906 laws that gave 
French democracy the secular legal 
frame, as we know it today.
This legal framework allows for 
equality between all citizens (reli-
giously inclined or not), rather than 
for equality between religions:
The secular recasting of the state, 
initiated in France with the acts 
of 1881 and 1886, then the Act 
of separation of Church and 
State of 9 December, 1905, cor-
responds to some sort of evidence 
enclosed in the very etymology 
of the word: the Res Publica 
addresses everybody, believers, 
atheists and agnostics alike and 
cannot therefore favour any-
body…. In that sense, secularity 
is akin to universalism, which is 
the essence of the republic. But it 
could not occur spontaneously. 
There had to be a movement to 
emancipate the current law from 
any submission to some specific 
religious persuasion. Hence, the 
republic is neither atheistic nor 
religious: it no longer arbitrates 
between beliefs but arbitrates 
between actions and is devoted 
only to the general interest…. At 
the same time, the ethical liberty 
of the private sphere is guaran-
teed. No conception of what 
the good life is can monopolize 
law or illegitimately extend the 
normative function of the law 
beyond the interest of the com-
munity of citizens. (Pena-Ruiz 
“A Secular Recasting”)
Having completed over more 
than a century the arduous task of 
expelling the churches from political 
power, the secular state undertook to 
secure the individual right of citizens 
to develop their own personal forms 
of spirituality—religious or not. 
Considering the abundance of articles 
in English, including scholarly ones, 
that display—today, in the wake of 
rising Muslim fundamentalist polit-
ical forces—an unbelievable degree 
of ignorance about secularism in 
France, it is worth looking at the law 
in some detail.
In its articles 1 and 2, the 1905 
law grants and protects individual 
rights to belief and practice. The 9 
December 1905 Act opens on two 
indivisible articles, grouped under 
the heading, “Title 1. Principles”:
“Section 1: the Republic shall 
ensure freedom of conscience. It 
shall guarantee free participation 
in religious worship, subject 
only to the restrictions laid 
down hereinafter in the interest 
of public order. Section 2: the 
Republic may not recognise, 
pay stipends to or subsidise any 
religious denomination. Conse-
quently, from 1 January in the 
year following promulgation of 
this Act all expenditure relating 
to participation in worship shall 
be removed from State, region 
and municipality budgets.”
Grouped under the same head-
ing, the two first articles of the 
law are obviously inseparable 
and are clearly referred to as 
principles. Religious freedom is 
but one version of the freedom 
of conscience (article 1) and is 
viewed only as a particular illus-
tration of the freedom. Having 
to coexist with the freedom of 
choosing to be an atheist or an 
agnostic, the freedom of opting 
for a religion obviously belongs 
to a more general category, which 
is the only one mentioned by 
the law. Insisting on “religious 
freedom” is in fact preserving 
the privilege of a spiritual option 
when the law henceforth rejects 
all privileges. This is why section 
1 is inseparable from section 2, 
which stipulates that the Re-
public does not recognise any 
religious denomination. This 
strictly means that it has passed 
from recognising certain denom-
inations (before 1905, Cathol-
icism, Lutheran and Reformed 
Protestantism, and Judaism) to 
renouncing all recognition. It is 
not passing from recognition of 
some to recognition of all, as a 
multireligious or communitarist 
interpretation would have it, but 
from a selective recognition to 
a strict non-recognition. This 
principle of non-recognition 
understood in its legal sense 
confirms the fact that no stipend 
or direct subsidy may be paid 
to any church by the state. The 
1905 act does not just stipulate 
that all churches are henceforth 
legally equal. It extends this 
equality to all spiritual choices, 
whether religious or not, by 
dispossessing the churches of 
any public law status. Assigning 
religions to the private sphere 
entails a radical secularization of 
the state. It henceforth declares 
itself incompetent in matters of 
spiritual options, and has not 
therefore to arbitrate between 
beliefs nor to let them encroach 
on the public sphere to shape 
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common norms. (Ruiz, “A Sec-
ular Recasting”) 
According to the 1905 law, reli-
gious belief is a personal option just 
like agnosticism or atheism. Hence 
the law does not grant “religious 
freedom” specifically, but freedom 
of conscience in general. For the 
first time, the law considers beliefs 
circumstances, civil servants stand as 
equal citizens of a secular republic, not 
as members and representatives of any 
community. However, it is useful to 
reiterate here that what these citizens 
do outside these functions is their 
personal choice in which the state will 
not interfere. One can easily see that 
the decision of the UK to grant each 
citizen permission to be received by 
hard, and ongoing struggle—and it 
continues to be so today.
The reactionary struggle in France 
against the eviction of (then) the 
Catholic Church and (now) religions 
in general from direct access to polit-
ical power through an undemocratic 
mode of representation6 has never 
stopped. It has taken different forms 
at different moments in history, 
other than that of the dominant 
Catholicism equal with each other. 
Personal stands are equally respected 
and none is privileged over the other, 
but neither religion nor the absence 
of religion (atheism) is granted any 
public privilege by the state. The 
state will simply not interact with the 
official representations of organized 
religions—it declares itself incom-
petent in religious matters, and it 
states that religion is not within its 
mandate—so that politics will not 
be instrumentalized by religion, nor 
will religion be instrumentalized by 
politics. Indeed, the history of Europe 
has largely shown how dangerous such 
instrumentalization may be.4
Secularism is not just another belief 
on par with religions; it is clearly and 
exclusively defined as a legal and 
administrative provision through 
which the role and place of religions 
in politics is regulated and limited.
It is in this context that one should 
understand the secular rule in France 
that civil servants, when they are in 
contact with the public, should not 
wear any sign of their religious or 
political affiliations, nor should teach-
ers, administrative staff, and pupils 
in secular state schools. Under these 
a representative of his/her religious or 
ethnic community when s/he goes to 
a police station, for instance, stands 
exactly at the other end of the political 
spectrum in matters of secularism: 
the entire society is communalized.
Secularism/laïcité is understood in 
this article as separation between reli-
gion and the state. I do not consider 
that several definitions of secularism 
exist (as is the common belief in the 
UK), but rather that there are pres-
ently many near-successful attempts 
at undermining laicity by redefining 
it as secularism in ways that allow the 
states to continue to grant religions 
political power. We are still, and 
may be more than ever before, in a 
struggle for secularism. It may hearten 
us to remember here and now that 
secularism is a hard-won right and 
that people always had to fight for it. 
What we face today with the rise of 
new religious-Rights,5 in particular 
the Muslim-Right, is not unlike what 
earlier secularists had to face. 
The Struggle for Secularism 
 
Nowhere, not even in the birthplace 
of laicity, has this right been easily 
won; everywhere it has been a long, 
from open war to the more modern 
attempts to dissolve and melt the 
principle of separation into the mud-
dy waters of multiculturalism. While 
the Catholic Church has apparently 
taken a back seat, the anti-secular 
struggle in Europe is now led by 
Muslim fundamentalism, a far-Right 
movement working under the cover 
of religion, with the active backing 
of the Catholic and Jewish religious 
authorities.
One of the many attempts to un-
dermine secularism is to reformulate 
and redefine it. The UK—logically 
considering the confusion it enter-
tains between head of church and 
head of state—promotes, under 
the apparently neutral principle of 
equal tolerance by the state of all 
religions, a formal recognition and 
representation of religions within 
the state, thereby planting the seeds 
of “communalism.” (I am using here 
the concept developed in South Asia 
to stigmatise the adverse effects of 
separating people and fellow citizens 
into communities.) The UK is play-
ing a leading role within European 
institutions insofar as its redefini-
tion—the switch from separation 
to equal tolerance—is now largely 
I do not consider that several definitions of secularism of exist … 
but rather that there are presently many near-successful attempts at 
undermining laicity by redefining it as secularism in ways that allow 
the states to continue to grant religions political power. 
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adopted by Europe. Consequently, 
more and more pressure is being put 
on France to abandon the historical 
definition of secularism and to adopt 
the Anglo-Saxon one in the name of 
human rights and religious rights. 
Historically, this policy had severe 
consequences throughout Asia and 
Africa, as British colonialism propa-
gated the “equal tolerance by the state” 
definition throughout its former 
Empire. We have recently witnessed 
in France various attempts by the 
Right-wing to add adjectives to the 
word secularism in order to modify 
its meaning and bring it closer to the 
British redefinition, such as “open 
secularism,” “inclusive secularism,” 
“plural secularism,” “positive secular-
ism,” etc.; all are intended to corrupt 
the concept.7
The major political consequence of 
this redefinition is “communalism”: 
while laïcity considers only individual 
citizens, UK “secularism” gives birth 
to communities and communalism 
(i.e., division among citizens and 
competition between different re-
ligions for political representation 
within the state):
The denominational neutrality 
of the republic cannot be assim-
ilated to a vague ethico-political 
relativism.… Secularity was 
actually introduced in the law 
with the acts of emancipation 
from religious supervision of 
school, public institutions, and 
then of the State. It is by essence 
a separation of State and Church, 
which rules out all Concordat 
regimes. The official recognition 
of certain worships involves a 
double exclusion: that of other 
worships and that of non-reli-
gious figures of spirituality. It 
encroaches on the public sphere, 
alienating it to the domination of 
religions. It makes no difference 
to recognize several religions: the 
alienation of the public field to 
religious persuasions is none 
the less patently obvious. (Ruiz, 
“France”)
In a globalized world where people, 
not just in richer Europe and North 
America but also within Africa and 
Asia, are increasingly mobile, popu-
lations of mixed origins and diverse 
religions and cultures, increasingly 
inhabit the same location. There is an 
equally increasing need for political 
and legal frames based on universal 
principles, beyond the specific re-
ligious and cultural norms of these 
diverse populations. Only secular-
ism can avoid competition between 
religions for public privileges and 
political power, as well as competition 
between citizens for imposing one’s 
own norms over others’. This requires 
that universalism should prevail and 
that laws common to all should be free 
from the particular cultural and reli-
gious norms and restrictions specific 
to one category of citizens. Therefore, 
absence of “separation” between states 
and churches/religions, especially 
in matters of law and education, is 
incompatible with equality of rights 
between all citizens (see also Ruiz, 
Dieu et Marianne). 
The consequences are heavy for 
women in formerly colonized coun-
tries, where the British colonizers 
imported their own definition of 
secularism: women are trapped in the 
colonial legacy of “community rights” 
that limits their access to universal 
rights, even in the eyes of their own 
independent governments. 
Women of migrant descent, 
who are now citizens of European 
countries, may further trapped into 
abandoning their voted rights as 
citizens in the defence of un-voted 
“community rights” imposed by 
“community leaders.” They are made 
to choose between two loyalties: to 
women’s rights or to “community 
rights.” A double bind indeed.
In fact, what we are witnessing in 
this moment in history is the increas-
ing trend for nations to abandon the 
principle of “one law for all,” and to 
accept different laws for different 
categories of citizens on the basis of 
their—often presumed—religious 
affiliation, thus creating an inequality 
of rights among individuals otherwise 
supposed, under the official constitu-
tions of most countries, to be equal 
before the law. This can be observed 
throughout the world, with a visible 
long-lasting influence of former col-
onizing countries’ definitions of “la-
icity” vs “secularism” on their former, 
albeit now independent, colonies. 
This can be observed in Britain with 
the recognition of the so-called Sharia 
courts, which are in fact arbitration 
courts that do not apply the law of the 
land but whose judgments are legally 
binding under the 1996 Arbitration 
Act. The religious court’s decisions 
can then be enforced by the county 
courts or the High Court (Hickley). 
Similarly, Jewish Beth Din courts 
have handled civil legal cases for 
more than a hundred years in Britain 
on the same basis, and now operate 
under the 1996 Arbitration Act (see 
also Taher; Rozenberg; Edwards). 
This is the ground on which Muslim 
fundamentalists claimed equality 
of treatment, not between citizens 
who are, in fact, denied equality, but 
between religions. 
In the past three years, there have 
been several attempts by Muslim 
fundamentalist groups in the U.K. 
(Lucas) and in the U.S. (Grayson) 
to enforce sex segregation in public 
universities (against U.K. gender 
equality rules) and in the U.K. to 
promote “sharia compliant” wills 
(Southall Black Sisters), which de-
nied Muslim women equal share, 
and excluded non-Muslim wives and 
adopted children from the rights to 
inheritance otherwise guaranteed to 
all under the law of the land.
It is worth noting that—at least for 
the time being—demands for accom-
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modating religiously inspired laws or 
practices do not focus on criminal 
law and huddud punishment (such 
as stoning for sex outside marriage 
or cutting off the hands of thieves), 
but they are limited to personal status 
laws (also called family codes). These 
laws affect primarily women through 
regulating marriage, polygamy, repu-
diation, divorce, custody of children, 
mores, colonial powers did want 
to trap colonized people into their 
supposedly ontological “difference,” 
as this was the basis for not granting 
them equal legal rights on par with 
the colonizers. Is this any different 
philosophically from what is being 
done today in Europe to citizens of 
migrant descent in the name of respect 
of their religions and cultures? 
the shying away from defending 
secular laws was detrimental not 
just to the advancement of women’s 
rights in family matters, but also to 
the unity of the women’s movement 
in general. After the Shah Bano 
case, which granted alimony to a 
repudiated old woman, feminists of 
Hindu majority background feared 
to be seen as anti-minority Muslims 
alimony, inheritance, etc. Under the 
guise of cultural and religious rights, 
women—and their subordination by 
the males in their communities—are 
the primary, and in fact the exclusive, 
focus of communal demands.
Abandoning democratically voted 
universal secular laws to accommo-
date communalist demands for sepa-
rate un-voted religious laws amounts 
to trading women’s human rights, 
temporarily appeasing fundamental-
ists through a highly undemocratic 
process. Abandoning secular princi-
ples and trading women’s rights for 
the sake of appeasing reactionaries 
and traditionalists is a policy that has 
been practised by colonial powers. 
Still today, women continue to pay 
the price for this legacy. It was “British 
India” who codified what passes today 
as “Muslim law” in India (Anderson). 
It is the French secular colonial power 
that codified, in the “overseas French 
provinces in Algeria,” the “Indigenous 
law” (Mayer) that became the basis 
on which the infamous family law of 
independent Algeria was designed.8 
These colonial, often syncretic 
re-inventions weigh heavily on today’s 
feminist struggles. Indeed, under 
the pretext of respecting Indigenous 
Just as the revolutionaries of the 
French Revolution were not revolu-
tionary enough to think that women 
too could enjoy the rights that men 
had just conquered,9 and therefore 
discriminated against them, “secular 
France” during colonial times was ob-
viously not secular enough to accept 
the idea that colonized Algerians too 
may have enjoyed the right to define 
their futures without interference 
from clerics. Algerian women still 
struggle to get rid of the family law 
that was initially, under colonization, 
presented as a symbol of cultural 
indigenous resistance to colonization 
(alas, Fanon seems to have fallen into 
the trap). In fact, it was the instrument 
of colonizers to control the resistance 
by throwing men a crumb: power over 
“their” women.
Indian feminists still struggle today 
to get rid of separate family laws for 
Hindus, Christians, and Muslims. 
These laws trap women into either 
defending their rights as women or 
defending their community from 
the attacks of the dominant religious 
group, even though these laws clearly 
prevent the rights of women within 
the family from moving forward 
(Mehta).10 It is worth noting how 
(or as would be said now: “Islam-
ophobic”), while rights-demanding 
women from Muslim minority 
background feared further rejection 
from their “community.” They also 
feared that if they persisted in their 
demands for rights, their Hindu 
background feminist counterparts 
would not stand by them. Isn’t this 
exactly what rights-demanding fem-
inists of Muslim heritage are facing 
in Europe today?
“Divide and rule”: whether it is 
India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, or Sri 
Lanka, the region is plagued with 
the fragmentation of citizens into 
religious identities, a practice that 
is inherited from the colonial era 
and from the British definition of 
secularism as equal tolerance by the 
state towards religious communities.
The same applies to African coun-
tries formerly colonized by Britain: 
in all of them, specific family laws 
(or Personal Status Laws) apply to 
different religious communities.11 
Therefore, the law discriminates 
against women as citizens, granting 
rights to some women citizens that 
are denied to others, by virtue of 
being born into a Christian, Muslim, 
or Animist family. Some countries, 
Only secularism can avoid competition between religions for public 
privileges and political power, as well as competition between citizens for 
imposing one’s own norms over others’. This requires that universalism 
prevail and that laws common to all should be free from the particular … 
religious norms and restrictions specific to one category of citizens.
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such as Senegal, still give women the 
final “choice” between, for instance, 
a monogamous or a polygynous 
marriage, which must be determined 
once and for all at the time of the 
marriage civil registration. One 
could ponder on the logic of giving 
anyone the choice between “more 
rights” and “fewer rights.” Moreover, 
numerous first-hand reports show 
that husbands-to-be who promised 
that—of course!—they would opt 
for a monogamous marriage, often 
change their minds at the very last 
second and request a polygynous 
marriage in front of the registrar. 
The “choice” left to the bride is to 
swallow her tears in the wake of this 
first betrayal, or create a scandal in 
front of both their extended families 
and numerous invitees—something 
that they can hardly face. “Choice,” 
when granted to the powerless, gen-
erally amounts to supporting the 
most powerful.
In the early 2000s, Canada wit-
nessed attempts to introduce discrim-
inatory legislations that would have 
deprived specific categories of the 
population (the Muslims) of rights 
enjoyed by all other citizens in the 
name of their geographical origin, 
hastily equated with a presumed re-
ligious faith (see Boyd). Interestingly, 
the Left and feminists in Canada were 
not unanimous in standing against 
such propositions of law, presumably 
because these propositions were 
presented as respectful of minorities’ 
difference, while in fact they would 
have deprived women of Muslim 
migrant of the legal rights enjoyed 
by all other Canadian women. Al-
though many Canadian women of 
Muslim origin openly opposed the bill 
(CCMW), it took external solidarity 
to enrol the support of the majority of 
women’s organisations in Canada. In 
solidarity with Canadian women of 
Muslim descent, the network Women 
Living Under Muslim Laws organized 
a speaking tour in Canada, featuring 
women from Algeria, Iran, India, 
South Africa, Bangladesh, etc.12 The 
aim was to explain in detail to Cana-
dian feminists what minority women 
would face if they did not enjoy any 
longer the protection of the law of 
the land, as well as why feminists in 
Canada should support secular laws, 
which were democratically voted by 
the people and could thus be changed 
by democratic means, rather than 
adopt supposedly divine (and there-
fore unchangeable) laws interpreted 
by conservative men. Each woman 
on the tour (myself included) gave 
multiple examples of the rights we 
lost when our countries moved to 
so-called sharia law. The tendency 
of the Left and “majority community 
women” is generally to shy away from 
supporting the universal rights of citi-
zens of Muslim descent under secular 
laws; it has been replicated on many 
occasions, in the name of respect for 
their unsurpassable otherness. 
More examples of the global trend 
to erase secular laws and replace them 
with religious ones specific to each 
“community” can be given even from 
secular France. Since the 1980s, nu-
merous attempts have been made by 
Muslim fundamentalists to alter laws 
and mores and to outlaw secularism, 
which they branded as discriminatory 
against minorities. Let me give a few 
examples. 1) They demanded the 
annulment of a civil marriage on the 
ground that the bride lied about being 
a virgin, “an essential quality” of the 
marriage.13 It took the government to 
step in and appeal against the court 
decision to grant the annulment (a 
very rare legal procedure) on such 
slippery grounds, rather than a sim-
ple divorce (which was immediately 
granted). 2) They demanded that a 
court hearing be postponed on the 
grounds that the accused was fasting 
during Ramadan.14 3) They demand-
ed not just halal meat to be served in 
school canteens but also that all food 
served be halal, otherwise it would 
be contaminated by the proximity of 
non-halal food. 4) They demanded 
that the curriculum in national 
state-run secular schools—where ed-
ucation is entirely free from primary 
school to university—be altered so as 
to eliminate graphic arts, gym for girls, 
and biology (due to the curriculum’s 
preference for evolutionism rather 
than creationism). 5) They demanded 
segregated time for Muslim women 
in swimming pools (Soulé). 6) They 
demanded that women in hospitals 
be exclusively approached by female 
personnel from cleaner to doctor.15 7) 
They demanded that religious signs 
be allowed in state secular schools (it 
is in this context that the demand for 
headscarves for girls, which made the 
headlines of the international media, 
should be understood) (Bennoune). 
Analyzing these examples leads us 
to more general political comments. 
The above-mentioned demands are 
not made at random: Muslim fun-
damentalists target the very secular 
principles that are the foundation 
of the French Republic. In their 
views, secular schools, civil marriage 
laws, or justice are to be amended 
so as to recognize the existence and 
pre-eminence of religious opinions. 
The demand for the annulment of a 
marriage is different from a request 
for divorce: while the second resolves 
the dispute between a couple, the first 
undercuts marriage laws which do not 
include acknowledging “virginity as 
an essential quality of the bride,” as 
does Muslim marriage law in many 
countries. This is therefore a legal 
encroachment of religious views into 
secular laws. The aim is not just to 
“accommodate” specific demands, 
but also to abandon founding prin-
ciples about the place of religions and 
religious laws in a secular political 
system. All these requests are geared 
towards making religion, at the very 
least, visible, and at worst to treat it 
on par with, or even to allow it to 
supersede, secular principles. Present-
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ing secularism, like atheism, as just 
another “religious” opinion or way of 
life is to undercut secularism entirely.
These are presented as demands 
from “Muslims” in the name of 
“Islam,” while progressive citizens 
of Muslim descent (both believers 
and unbelievers) and progressive 
theologians of Islam loudly voice 
their dissent regarding demands 
ference, the trap into which human 
rights organisations, the Left at large, 
and too many feminists have fallen 
over the past few decades in Europe. 
By unduly accepting the ideological 
construct of homogeneous commu-
nal identities without ever asking who 
speaks for this community and with 
what legitimacy, by essentializing 
Otherness and forcing individuals 
damentalist Right-wing organizations 
cannot dream of a better situation to 
further their ends. Additionally, the 
cultural relativist Left and feminists 
undermine their own political forces 
by failing to ally with and support 
progressives voices among citizens 
of migrant descent and by cowardly 
shrinking from the potential accusa-
tion of “Islamophobia”—a concept 
made in their name (see Bencheikh, 
Marianne et le Prophète).16 Progres-
sive citizens of Muslim descent and 
progressive Muslims love and openly 
defend secularism (Helie Lucas “The 
Struggle”). Cultural relativism as it 
prevails in Europe today actually 
promotes the idea of a totalizing, 
transcontinental, uniform, ahistori-
cal, Muslim religion-cum-culture and 
excludes progressive people from it. It 
recognizes only the most reactionary 
opinions as legitimately representing 
Islam and Muslims. Therefore the 
Left and feminist supporters of cul-
tural relativism de facto support, in 
“The Other’s community,” the very 
Rightist forces that they would fight 
within their own “community.”
Moreover, by locking citizens, 
including dissenting ones, into an 
imaginary Otherness (Helie Lucas 
“What is Your Tribe?”) they create 
ex nihilo a falsely homogenized 
“community” that fits the negative 
stereotypes that the far-Right openly 
displays about “Muslims” but that the 
Left and feminists usually disapprove 
of as racist—what a contradiction. 
Secularism does not erase differ-
ences between individuals, but it 
definitely avoids essentializing dif-
into a group identity by virtue of 
their birthplace without their con-
sent, and by allowing the unelected 
self-appointed representatives of these 
groups to weigh in on political deci-
sions, cultural relativists have actually 
abandoned the hard-won rights that 
secularism granted all citizens.
Economic liberalism tends to 
favour communalist policies, as op-
posed to secular ones, because com-
munalism plays a determinant role 
in the fragmentation of the people. 
When migrant workers in the U.K. 
were all initially seen as “foreigners,” 
they regrouped and fought collective-
ly for their rights as workers on par 
with the indigenous British workers. 
Then they were partitioned as South 
Asians, Turks, or Africans and encour-
aged to create their own communities, 
a process which highlighted their 
cultural differences and inevitably 
affected the earlier common strug-
gle for rights. Now they are further 
divided along religious lines (South 
Asians, for instance, have been split 
into “Hindus,” “Muslims,” “Sikhs,” 
etc.) to the point that human rights 
organisations now even speak about 
“Hindu human rights,” or “Muslim 
human rights,” etc. Capital and fun-
fostered by fundamentalists to silence 
dissent.
Secularism is Definitely a 
Women’s Issue
There is no denying that, historically, 
secularism alone, even within secular 
states, has not automatically granted 
full rights to women. Detractors of 
secularism have always been quick 
to point out all the inequalities that 
remain between citizens even after the 
separation of organized religions and 
state had been declared. Women were 
not always included as equal citizens 
in revolutionary attempts to win 
equality and equal rights, nor were 
the colonized people in Africa and 
Asia during the previous centuries, 
nor are today’s sexual minorities in 
many countries in Europe and North 
America.
However, what secularism does do 
is regulate and limit undemocratic 
political representation of “church-
es.” This is not a small achievement, 
and we should hold on to it. My 
generation may have believed for 
some time that this struggle was one 
of the past, with the decline of the 
Catholic Church, but we have been 
There is no denying that, historically, secularism alone, even within 
secular states, has not automatically granted full rights to women. 
Detractors of secularism have always been quick to point out all the 
inequalities that remain between citizens even after the separation 
of organized religions and state had been declared.
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quickly awakened to the fact that it 
was replaced by Muslim fundamen-
talism as the spearhead of religious 
claims to political power during the 
second half of the twentieth century. 
Concomitantly, women’s rights have 
suffered many new assaults, in the 
name of gods, with the rise of identity 
politics.
In other words, if secularism is 
this is the end of democracy—i.e., 
the hard-won power of the people 
to formulate, express, and change 
their laws according to their will by 
voting. And when the laws are reli-
giously inspired and binding, they 
deny citizenship agency not only to 
agnostics and non-believers, but also 
to believers who read their religion 
with progressive lenses, and to follow-
pregnancies as they feel they have to 
in order to fulfil their religious duties. 
The secular system does not force an 
individual woman who is a practicing 
Muslim to accept an equal share of 
inheritance on par with her brothers, 
but it denies Muslim clerics the right 
to make inequality in inheritance 
part of the law of the land. A Muslim 
woman will still be able to donate her 
not a sufficient condition to ensure 
women’s rights, it is a necessary one, 
even an indispensible one. Because 
it favours the rights of communities 
over the rights of individuals, commu-
nalism induces a hierarchy of rights 
in which women’s rights come last, 
after religious rights, minority rights, 
and cultural rights. And organized 
religions have generally been instru-
mental to the oppression of people 
and specifically of women.
Many so-called “Muslim countries” 
experienced and still experience the 
rise of fundamentalist forces that seek 
to dictate to the state and to citizens 
their own interpretation of a suppos-
edly divine law. In the words of Ali 
Belhadj, the then vice president of 
the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 
Algeria, announcing on the eve of the 
December 1991 elections that, should 
FIS win these elections, it will be 
the end of parliamentary democracy 
and there will be no more elections 
under FIS rule: “If we have the law 
of God, why do we need the law of 
the people? One should kill all these 
unbelievers” (Belhadj). When the laws 
are not voted on by citizens any more 
but are ready-made in conformity 
to a supposedly divine prescription, 
ers of other non-recognised creeds. In 
such a context, women demanding 
rights are quickly labelled kofr, and 
anti-Islam by fundamentalists. The 
situation is similar in countries of 
emigration. While secular laws today 
defend women’s access to universal 
rights, communalism induces intro-
duces a “choice,” just like in colonial 
situations, places women in a position 
in which they are forced to defend 
their rights or to defend community 
rights—i.e., mores and rules defined 
by conservative men. We will not 
dwell here on the contentious issue of 
“choice” and agency, but simply note 
that only secular systems free women 
from this double bind.
Secularism keeps religions and reli-
gious institutions from infringing on 
democratically voted legal rights. The 
secular system does not force individ-
ual women who are Roman Catholic 
believers to practice contraception or 
recourse to abortion; it simply denies 
the Vatican the right to enact a law 
forbidding reproductive rights in the 
name of god. It prevents the Vatican 
from forbidding citizens who want 
to from buying contraceptive devices 
at the nearest drugstore. Catholic 
women can still go through as many 
share to her brothers if she believes 
this is her religious duty.
Secularism gives rights; it does not 
force rights down one’s throat. As 
we women all experienced, enough 
pressure can be exerted on individual 
women by other individuals who have 
moral authority or influence over 
them to make a woman renounce her 
legal rights. Let’s not add to her plight 
by forcing her to permanently have to 
“choose” between the law of the land 
and “religious laws” or “cultural rules” 
at the risk of exclusion from her family 
and social group. Secular laws are her 
most efficient (necessary albeit not 
sufficient) protection against religious 
or cultural oppression.
This explains why so many women 
of migrant Muslim descent (both 
believers in Islam and atheists) in 
Europe and North America are now 
on the forefront of the struggle for 
laïcité—i.e., total separation between 
religions and states—and against 
the introduction of separate laws 
for different categories of citizens in 
places where governments abide by 
the redefinition of secularism as state’s 
equal tolerance of all religions. We 
find them in the U.S.A., in Canada, 
in France, in the UK, in Germany, 
If secularism is not a sufficient condition to ensure women’s rights, 
it is a necessary one, even an indispensible one. Because it favours 
the rights of communities over the rights of individuals, communalism 
induces a hierarchy of rights in which women’s rights come last, 
after religious rights, minority rights, and cultural rights. 
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etc. (see Bencheikh, Marianne et le 
Prophète). Similarly, we find women 
at the forefront of secular struggles 
in the countries of the former Soviet 
bloc (such as Poland, Russia, Ukraine, 
Croatia, Serbia, etc.), where various 
denominations of Christianity have 
infringed upon the laws of the lands 
and reintroduced religious restric-
tions on women’s rights (starting with 
reproductive rights).
While France’s Leftist intellectu-
als slept for a long time over their 
glorious secular past, it was women 
of Algerian descent who first blew 
the whistle regarding the dangers 
of forceful Muslim fundamentalist 
groups challenging the foundational 
secular laws. Ahead of most Left 
thinkers and theorists, who ignored 
the fundamentalist danger for far too 
long and held the view that the prior-
ity was the anti-imperialist struggle, 
women of migrant Muslim descent 
insisted that struggles against capi-
talism and imperialism and struggles 
for secularism and against extreme 
right religious fundamentalist forces 
should be fought simultaneously, 
without prioritizing one over the 
other. For this reason, anti-funda-
mentalist women secularists in Eu-
rope have been repeatedly accused of 
betrayal by the Left. Running across 
the tide, a poem entitled “I was shot 
by my secondary enemy” points at 
the probable outcome of the main 
enemy theory, cherished by the Left 
for so long: 
Totally caught into my struggle 
against the main enemy,
I was shot by my secondary 
enemy,
Not from the back, treacherous-
ly, as his main enemies claimed, 
But directly, from the position it 
had long been occupying, 
And in keeping with his declared 
intentions that I did not bother 
about, thinking they were in-
significant. 
(Fried, Cent poems sans frontier, 
my translation)
Maybe these “declared intentions” 
were seen as “insignificant” for the 
simple reason that fundamentalists 
smartly target women’s rights first, 
and that the Left is still dominated 
by male thinkers.
Like most revolutionaries before 
them, the Left does not automatically 
include colonized people or women 
into the beneficiaries of equal rights, 
through democracy and secularism.
Because they have been made aware 
of the dangers of religious funda-
mentalism in the countries of origin 
of their families, and of the value of 
secularism in their countries of immi-
gration, women of migrant Muslim 
descent are playing a major role in the 
defence of secularism, secular laws, 
and secular values against Muslim 
fundamentalists in Western Europe 
today. Numerous new organisations 
are emerging, very often atheist ones. 
The two first Ex-Muslim Councils 
were set up in Germany and the UK 
by women of Iranian descent. These 
are organisations that denounce the 
acceptance in Europe of the concepts 
of blasphemy, heresy, and apostasy; as 
indicated in their name, they uphold 
the right to leave the religion one 
has been brought up in, without 
being condemned to death and ex-
ecuted for doing so. In Canada, the 
defence of secular laws was initiated 
by the progressive women’s organi-
sation Canadian Council of Muslim 
Women, led by practicing believers, 
and by the No Sharia Campaign, 
which was led by an atheist Iranian 
woman. This is an illustration of the 
fact that believers and atheists can 
stand together for secular laws. Many 
believers want their faith to remain 
a private affair and want to prevent 
the religious-Right from infringing 
on the laws of the land. Similarly, it 
is women who lead the struggle for 
secularism in Eastern Europe, with 
the pro-Choice movement in Poland, 
the Coalition for Secularism in Serbia, 
the Femen in Ukraine, etc. 
Relentlessly calling on the Left to 
defend secular laws and denouncing 
its unholy collusion with fundamen-
talist religious-Rights movements, 
secular women are also playing a 
major role in the enlightenment of 
the Left in Europe regarding the 
extreme Right-wing political nature 
of religious fundamentalist forces.17 
Prominent Leftist thinkers are still 
a long way away in their analysis 
of Muslim fundamentalism, with 
notable exceptions: 
The control of capital over 
bodies, its strong will to reveal 
their market value, does not at all 
reduce their control by religious 
law and the theological will to 
make them disappear. The ways 
of oppression are as numerous 
and inexhaustible as those of 
god are mysterious. The poor 
dialectic of main and secondary 
contradictions, forever revolv-
ing, already played too many 
bad tricks. And the “secondary 
enemy,” too often underestimat-
ed, because the fight against the 
main enemy was claimed to be 
a priority, sometimes has been 
deadly. (Bensaïd)
If this awareness gains ground, and 
if a philosophical and political shift 
takes place in the Left in this respect, it 
will be thanks to the efforts of secular 
feminists and to their activism on the 
ground. We must admit that, at the 
forefront of this worldwide struggle 
are the women of Muslim heritage, 
as the adverse circumstances they face 
are of a magnitude that is nowhere to 
be found. In our countries of origin, 
we are facing not only unfavourable 
changes in the laws but also death, 
enslavement, and torture at the hands 
of armed religious militia, not only 
in one country, but on at least two 
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continents. This explains why those 
of us in the diaspora relentlessly 
denounce the early warning signs of 
rising fundamentalism and confront 
the Western Left when it does not 
take up the defence of secular values.
It is even more important today to 
reach the Left when the traditional xe-
nophobic extreme Right tries to hijack 
the concept of secularism, equated 
to “Western values” by the National 
Front in France, just as the Hindu 
Right in India had been supporting 
Indian women’s demands for secular 
family laws, provided the secular law 
was aligned with the Hindu family 
law. As we know, this unfortunately 
resulted in the abandonment of the 
struggle for a uniform civil code by 
Indian feminists. We do not want a 
similar fear of feeding into the ex-
treme-Right in Europe—where they 
are everywhere on the rise—to be used 
against women’s rights to secularism. 
The biggest danger we now face is 
the adoption of “equal tolerance by 
the state,” as a perverse European 
definition of secularism vs laicity. So 
far, although it is a hard struggle, it is 
not—not yet—a lost battle, for fem-
inist secularists can stand on the vast 
body of conceptual work inherited 
from the Enlightenment era.
If we can agree that secularism 
alone is not enough to guarantee 
women’s rights, we must state that 
it is definitely a necessary condition 
without which “divine” laws are un-
democratically forced upon women 
citizens. Whether it is the Vatican, the 
Orthodox Church, or the Evangelists 
throughout the Americas, Africa, 
and Eastern Europe; or Daesh, Boko 
Haram, the Taliban, al Qaeda, the 
Shababs, the GIA, etc. throughout 
Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and 
now in the western diasporas; or 
on a much smaller scale the Hindu 
Right or the Buddhist Right in South 
Asia and South East Asia, religious 
fundamentalists have again started 
the conquest of political power: 
democracy and women’s rights have 
everything to lose in the process. 
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Endnotes
1The word ‘laïc’ comes from the Latin 
word laicus, which itself comes from 
the Greek word λαϊκός, laikos; it 
means ‘common, from the people’ 
(Laos) i.e. someone who is not part of 
the clergy, hence, although a Christian 
who follows the Church, someone 
who is ignorant in theological matters; 
it is opposed to κληρικός, klerikos 
(clerc), a man who received religious 
education and is part of the clergy. 
Secularism comes from the Latin 
word saecularis. “Secular” is what 
belongs to the world—i.e., not to 
the Church.
2Taslima Nasreen has used the term 
laicity since 2009. See, also, “What 
is French ‘Laïcité?”
3The 2005 law on secularism passed 
under Sarkozy’s presidency actually 
weakens the 1905 law; it moves from 
“no sign” of religious affiliation to “no 
ostentatious signs.” This allows for 
interpretation. (Source?) 
4As testified by the religious wars like 
the massacre of Saint Barthelemy 
(massacre of Protestants during several 
days in 1572 in Paris then extended to 
more than twenty cities in France), to 
the murder of Giordano Bruno (born 
in Italy in1548, a Dominican monk 
and a philosopher well informed of 
Copernic thesis who was accused 
of heresy and atheism tortured and 
burnt to death by the Inquisition), 
or the assassination of Chevalier 
de la Barre (accused of heresy and 
sacrilege—blasphemy was not any 
longer punished by death) who was 
tortured and burnt to death in 1766 
at age nineteen for refusing to uncover 
his head when a religious procession 
was passing by and for owning the 
Dictionnaire Philosophique written by 
Voltaire, despite attempts by Enlight-
enment philosophers to save his life; 
the outcry that followed this ordeal 
and execution are believed to be one 
of the factors that sparked the secular 
revolution of 1789. 
5In order to facilitate the reading 
of this article, I will use a capital 
letter for political affiliation—such 
as: extreme-Right, religious-Right, 
etc.—and the lowercase for rights 
as in: people rights, human rights, 
women’s rights, religious rights, etc. 
6It has been a long struggle to come 
to the Secular Republic. After a brief 
separation of church and state in 
1795, Napoleon re-established the 
Catholic Church as the state religion 
with the Concordat of 1801. Today, 
this provision still exists in the region 
Alsace-Moselle and there are still 
many demands for the suppression 
of this exception to laicité. Article 10 
of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen states that: “No 
one may be disturbed on account 
of his opinions, even religious ones, 
as long as the manifestation of such 
opinions does not interfere with the 
established Law and Order.” The 
1871 Paris Commune proclaims 
state secularism on April3, 1871; but 
it is cancelled after its defeat. From 
1879, the French state establishes 
a national secularization program 
in order to eliminate the still very 
prominent influence of the Church 
in the education and health systems 
which since the Middle Ages have 
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been running charity institutions: the 
state takes charge of these institutions 
by organizing the funding, training 
and staffing in these crucial sectors, 
and by the removal of priests from 
the administrative committees of hos-
pitals and boards of charity, and the 
substitution of lay women for nuns 
in hospitals. Jules Ferry, under the 
Third Republic, in 1881–1882 purg-
es from any religious instruction all 
the state-run and state-funded secular 
schools. In 1886, the secularization 
of the teaching staff of the National 
Education system is established. Di-
vorce and civil marriage become legal 
despite the Church opposition; civil 
marriage must be celebrated prior to 
any religious marriage, as it is the only 
one the Republic recognizes as legal, 
although the state does not interfere 
in the celebration of additional reli-
gious ceremonies. Seminarians loose 
the privilege of being exempted from 
conscription. Public prayers at the 
beginning of each Parliamentary Ses-
sion are abolished, all religious actions 
and emblems are banished from the 
courts, the schools, the army and all 
public buildings. All these struggles 
lead to the laws of 1905 and 1906 that 
codify secularism as we know it today.
7In 2007, there was an outcry in 
France against the Discours du La-
tran, in which the president Nicolas 
Sarkozy (excerpts in French below) 
used the concept of “positive laïcité” 
and stated that a secular teacher will 
never be able to convey to the stu-
dents the same morality standards 
as a religious one. He also speaks of 
France’s Christian roots that should 
be most valued. 
“La laïcité ne saurait être la 
négation du passé. Elle n’a pas 
le pouvoir de couper la France 
de ses racines chrétiennes. Elle a 
tenté de le faire. Elle n’aurait pas 
dû…. Nous devons … assumer les 
racines chrétiennes de la France, et 
même les valoriser…. Le temps est 
désormais venu que, dans un même 
esprit, les religions, en particulier 
la religion catholique qui est notre 
religion majoritaire, et toutes les 
forces vives de la nation regardent 
ensemble les enjeux de l’avenir…. 
Le fait spirituel, c’est la tendance 
naturelle de tous les hommes à 
rechercher une transcendance. 
Le fait religieux, c’est la réponse 
des religions à cette aspiration 
fondamentale…. Or, longtemps 
la République laïque a sous-es-
timé l’importance de l’aspiration 
spirituelle…. Ce n’est qu’en 2002 
qu’elle a accepté le principe d’un 
dialogue institutionnel régulier 
avec l’Eglise catholique. Qu’il me 
soit également permis de rappeler 
les critiques virulentes dont j’ai été 
l’objet au moment de la création 
du Conseil français du culte mu-
sulman…. Et puis je veux dire 
également que, s’il existe incontest-
ablement une morale humaine in-
dépendante de la morale religieuse, 
la République a intérêt à ce qu’il 
existe aussi une réflexion morale 
inspirée de convictions religieus-
es. D’abord parce que la morale 
laïque risque toujours de s’épuiser 
ou de se changer en fanatisme 
quand elle n’est pas adossée à une 
espérance qui comble l’aspiration 
à l’infini. Ensuite parce qu’une 
morale dépourvue de liens avec 
la transcendance est davantage ex-
posée aux contingences historiques 
et finalement à la facilité…. C’est 
pourquoi j’appelle de mes vœux 
l’avènement d’une laïcité positive, 
c’est-à-dire une laïcité qui, tout en 
veillant à la liberté de penser, à 
celle de croire et de ne pas croire, 
ne considère pas que les religions 
sont un danger, mais plutôt un 
atout…. Dans la transmission 
des valeurs et dans l’apprentissage 
de la différence entre le bien et le 
mal, l’instituteur ne pourra jamais 
remplacer le pasteur ou le curé…. 
(“Le Président Sarkozy”; see also 
Mélenchon) 
8Listen to “Ouech Dek” (on You-
Tube). A beautiful protest song, 
written and performed by twenty-six 
women artists in the three languages 
currently spoken in Algeria, confront 
the religious judges who drafted the 
1984 family code that confirm the 
inferiority status of Algerian women 
by denying them adulthood status: 
“Hi judge! What’s wrong with you?!”
9As we all experienced, neither revo-
lution, nor secularism automatically 
grant rights to women. A pioneering 
feminist, Olympe de Gouges de-
manded in vain equal rights for all 
citizens including women, during the 
French revolution. She paid it with 
her life. Born in 1748, she was exe-
cuted in Paris on November 3, 1793. 
On the model of the revolutionary 
Declaration des droits de l’homme et 
du citoyen, she wrote a Declaration 
of the Rights of Women as Citizens 
which proclaims equality of sexes in 
civil and political rights, as women’s 
birthright taken away by prejudice. 
She wrote: “If women have a right 
to be executed, they should also have 
the right to speak up” (“La femme a 
le droit de monter sur l’échafaud; elle 
doit avoir également celui de monter 
à la Tribune”). On January 2016 the 
then French Minister of Justice (a 
woman) gave the name of Olympe 
de Gouges to the building hosting 
her Ministry.
10After the Shah Bano case, the Indian 
feminist movement abandoned the 
struggle for a secular uniform civil 
code, for fear that this demand be 
hijacked by the Hindu-right, and 
manipulated against the Muslim 
minority; similarly, there are feminists 
in France today who step back out 
of the battle for secularism because 
the National Front is attempting to 
hijack the concept. 
“An important concern that 
such communalisation creates 
for women’s movement, is that 
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the conservative forces employ 
women themselves to counter 
the argument for women’s pro-
tections and rights. For instance 
this argument for protection 
of personal laws was also used 
to protest the banning of Sati 
(widow immolation). Women 
activists opposing Sati were 
deemed as western and elite and 
a large counter procession was 
organized by women seeking 
the protection of their right to 
commit Sati.” (Saxena) 
11For instance, African countries such 
as Cameroon, Nigeria, the Gambia, 
Senegal, etc, and the whole of the 
Middle East, have separate family 
laws according to individual citi-
zens’ presumed religion. See details 
on what rights these religious laws 
deprive women of, in Knowing Our 
(WLUML). It is interesting to note 
that in former British colonies the 
plurality of legal systems is directly 
justified by “secularism” (defined as 
“equal tolerance” for all religions—in 
which case colonized people are at 
par with colonizers), while in former 
French colonies, as was the case in 
Algeria or Senegal, it is the racist 
assumption that colonized people 
(“les indigènes”) do not—yet—de-
serve benefitting from laicity and 
may access it later, when they are 
more civilized. For the time being, 
they can be left with their customs. 
A reasoning very similar to the one 
Olympe de Gouges denounced in the 
male revolutionaries vis à vis women 
revolutionaries, during the French 
revolution. It can also be found in 
the Whites’ Enlightenment discourse 
over Black people.
12The report celebrates the opportu-
nity “to learn from the experiences 
and legal realities of women in the 
Women Living Under Muslim Laws 
Network (WLUML), living in India, 
Pakistan, South Africa, Algeria, the 
United Kingdom, France and other 
parts of Europe and the Arab world” 
(see also “Canada: Support”). The 
1991 Arbitration Act allowed for the 
use of any laws in arbitration. It did 
not differentiate between areas such as 
commercial or family, and so the Act 
was permissible for religious commu-
nities. There were no Christian groups 
using the Act for family matters. The 
Jewish Beit Din religious tribunal did 
use private legally binding arbitration 
for commercial matters and in a year 
we heard that there were two family 
issues when the arbitration act was 
used. There were no records of any 
other arbitral awards.
According to the Canadian Coun-
cil of Muslim Women (private 
communication, April 13, 2009), 
the Arbitration Act allowed for the 
use of private legally binding arbitra-
tions and there were only two Jewish 
instances that came forward in their 
research. The CCMW went for no 
religious arbitration. Now, of course, 
no religious laws are recognized by 
the courts (see “Canada: Support”; 
“Muslim Women Embrace”).
13I looked in vain for a decent article 
in English on this landmark case, but 
was discouraged by their bias (includ-
ing calling a civil marriage between 
two Muslims a “Muslim marriage”! 
It is hard to believe but it is true) (see 
“L’annulation d’un marriage.” See 
also “Nullité” Fourest; Bennhold; 
Rotman; Huyette). 
14We note that no such request was 
ever made in Muslim countries where 
courts do not remain closed during 
times of religious fasting. Anger over 
“Ramadan” trial delay: 
“Critics say the decision is a 
breach of France’s strict separa-
tion of religion and state. The 
trial of seven men for armed 
robbery was due to start on 
16 September in Rennes. But 
last week the court agreed to a 
request from a lawyer for one 
of the accused to put it off until 
January. In his letter asking for 
the delay, the lawyer noted that 
if the trial were to start now, it 
would fall in the Muslim month 
of Ramadan. His client, a Mus-
lim, would have been fasting for 
two weeks and thus, he said, be 
in no position to defend himself 
properly. He would be physically 
weakened and too tired to follow 
the arguments as he should.”
15A testimony at the Stasi Commis-
sion: 
En consultation ordinaire, chacun 
peut choisir son médecin. Mais en 
urgence? A Montreuil comme à 
Lyon, les soignants expliquent qu’il 
leur faut parfois parlementer avec 
des maris qui refusent une césari-
enne, parce qu’elle sera le fait d’un 
home….” C’est stressant, surtout 
quand on reçoit des menaces ou 
des insultes”, soupire le docteur 
Pierre-Yves Barrier, gynécologue à 
l’hôpital de Villefranche, à Gleizé 
(Rhône). Il y a sept ans, un mari a 
refusé qu’il accouche par césarienne 
sa femme. Trois jours après, il 
apprend qu’elle a accouché ailleurs 
d’un enfant mort. (In normal 
circumstances, one can choose 
one’s medical doctor, but what 
about emergencies? In Montreuil 
as in Lyon, the medical staff has 
to take issue with some husbands 
who refuse a caesarean cut on the 
ground that it would performed 
by a male doctor. “This is stress-
ful, especially when one is facing 
threats and insults” said docteur 
Pierre-Yves Barrier, gynecologist 
in Villefranche hospital, in 
Gleizé (Rhône). Seven years 
ago a husband refused that he 
performed a caesarean cut on his 
wife. Three days later he learnt 
that she gave birth, elsewhere, 
to a still born baby.” [“L’hôpital 
confronté,” my translation])
See also Thibodeau “Patientes 
voilées même à l’hôpital”).
16“Ce sont les musulmans qui devraient 
expliquer à leurs coréligionnaires qu’il 
faut éviter de ridiculiser Dieu dans 
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l’interprétation de Sa parole. Si le 
Coran a recommandé le voile, c’est dans 
le seul objectif de préserver la dignité 
et la personnalité de la femme selon 
le moyen disponible à l’époque de la 
Révélation. Si, aujourd’hui, le même 
moyen ne réalise plus le même objectif, il 
ne faut pas s’attarder sur ce moyen mais 
le chercher ailleurs. Paradoxalement, ce 
qui préserve aujourd’hui la personnalité 
et assure l’avenir de la jeune fille, c’est 
l’école. C’est en s’instruisant que la 
femme peut se défendre contre toute 
atteinte à sa féminité et à sa dignité. 
Aujourd’hui, le voile de la musulmane 
en France, c’est l’école laïque, gratuite 
et obligatoire” (Bencheikh Marianne 
et le Prophète 144; see also Kacimi).
17For more examples of the role 
of women in promoting a secular 
analysis, see Lucas, The Struggle 
for Secularism in Europe and North 
America; it gives many examples of 
the leadership of women in secular 
struggles.
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kathy ashby
Another Party
There she is again, of course with him
never letting her go anywhere alone.
Why are they both beaming,
as if they’ve been shopping and
showing off their new clothes? Do they think we forgot?
We stare.
He walks across the room.
She follows.
We gather like a herd smelling wolf
heads down; keeping thoughts from stumbling across the room,
after the last time, his sudden shouts, stomping feet, slamming doors,
wheels screeching down the side street,
when our hearts dipped in unison at her shrug, glistening eyes staring through us,
the smile super-glued
how we talked around it, him, her. Someone actually said, “The elephant in the room.”
She finds a ride home; of course we want to help. Goodbyes are sweet and swift.
We hide behind how-must-she-cope and life-goes-on.
Somewhere between she lives and somewhere between she is.
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